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Article 5

NOTES
Labor Law
UNIONIZATION OF MUNICIPAL PoLIcE FoRcEs

The past two or three decades have witnessed a remarkable
growth of organized labor in this country. This period has not been
without its difficulties as labor has attempted to organize various classes
of municipal employees, including police forces. The current attempt
to unionize the police force of New York City by the United Transport Workers, CIO,1 has again focused national attention on this
problem. An examination of decisions rendered by the highest appellate
tribunals of many of our states manifests an almost unanimous judicial
opposition to the unionization of policemen. 2 These courts also sanction the dismissal of police officers who refuse to relinquish membership
in labor unions. Despite this apparent judicial unanimity in the state
courts, there has been no determination of the issue by the Shpreme
Court of the United States, even though in practically every instance
appeal has been made to various individual protective clauses of the
Constitution. 3 The judicial opposition to police labor organizations
has not prevented the State, County, and Municipal Workers, AFL,
from organizing the police departments of sixty-two American cities,
among them Baltimore and Los Angeles. 4 In addition there are many
writers on the subject who disagree with the judicial reasoning.5
Consequently there is merit in analyzing the question whether municipal policemen have the right to organize and join labor unions.
1

N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1951, p. 1, col. 1.

2 Perez v. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App.
(2d) 638, 178 P. (2d) 537 (1947); State Lodge of Michigan, Fraternal Order
of Police v. Detroit, 318 Mich. 182, 27 N.W. (2d) 612 (1947); Fraternal Order
of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310 (1943); City of Jackson v.
McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So. (2d) 319 (1946); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68,
206 S.W. (2d) 547 (1947); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P. (2d)
762 (1947); C.I.O. v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W. (2d) 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946);
Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935).

3 Hickman v. City of Mobile, ....Ala...., 53 So. (2d) 752 (1951)
(freedom of speech and right to assemble peacefully); Fraternal Order of Police
v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310 (1943) (right of an individual to
control his private life); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W. (2d)

547 (1947)

(freedom of speech and rights under the Due Process Clause); Goodwin v.
Oklahoma,

199

Okla.

26, 182

P.

(2d)

762

(1947)

(rights under the

Equal

Protection Clause).
4

N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1951, § 1, p. 1, col. 3.
5 SPzao, GovERNm'mT As Einoxx (1948); ZISKIND, ONE THousAND
STRmIEs oF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYE-ES (1940); Comment, UNION LABOR AND THE
MuxcirAL EMPLOYER, 45 ILL. L. Rv. 364 (1950); [1947] Wis. L. Rv. 693.
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NOTES
I.
The attempts by municipal police officers to organize into unions
have been made in comparatively recent times; the first was in 1918
and involved the police force of Cincinnati, Ohio. 6 When the policemen
met to discuss plans for obtaining a pay increase, the chief of police
detailed thee plain-clothes officers to determine the nature of the
meeting. When the investigators were forcibly ejected from the assembly the chief of police suspended the chairman of the meeting and
three others.
Meanwhile, an AFL organization was attempting to form a union.
This was accomplished when the policemen, who had met to consider
their plight, formed a union affiliated with the Cincinnati Central Labor
Council. The policemen also decided not to return to work until the
suspended members were reinstated and the strike which followed
immediately continued for three days until a compromise solution
was found. Taking the advice of the mayor of Cincinnati, who had
stated that unions were for laborers, but not for policemen, they
abandoned their union, forming a welfare association in its stead. At
all times during the strike, the policemen maintained that they unionized and were striking only because they wanted their brother officers
reinstated. When this purpose was satisfactorily accomplished they
voluntarily abandoned the union and the strike.
The following year in Boston another police strike occurred. 7 The
conditions which led to this strike arose from the policemen's demand
the previous year for better working conditions and higher wages
necessitated by increasing prices. After the Boston police commissioner
refused to meet with the policemen's benefit association, which was
their representative, they decided to form a union chartered under
the AFL. Since this had not yet been forbidden them, the union was
formed and received a charter from the AFL. The police commissioner
then issued an order forbidding membership in a union, and several
weeks later suspended nineteen officers for violating it. Confused
accusations and replies were heard until Mayor Peters of Boston
issued a statement that: 8
The issue between the commissioner and the policemen is clear-cut.
It is a question of whether the policemen have a right to form a union
and become affiliated with the American Federation of Labor....

From then on the economic issue which had given rise to the problem
became a secondary matter and the right to organize was considered
of primary importance.
6 Zisx=, op. dt. supra note 5, at 35.
7 Authority for the Boston police strike discussion was obtained from the
following sources: CooLoGE, THE AuTOBioGRAPHY or CALVIN CooLDGE 127-34
(1929); R33vNE, LABOR UNioNs AND MIUcsIrAL EwLOY LAW 106-7 (1946);
SPERo, op. dt. supra note 5, at 252-81; ZIs! ND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 39-51.
8 As quoted in SPERO, op. cit. Supra note 5, at 260.
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Talk of a strike on the part of the policemen led the mayor to
form a citizens' committee which conducted an investigation and
submitted a report to him. The committee suggested that the police
surrender their AFL charter but maintain their union as an independent
organization. The mayor submitted the plan to the police commissioner
who disregarded it even though it was apparently agreeable to the
policemen. When the commissioner formally dismissed the suspended
officers, the policemen called a strike to demonstrate their loyalty to
the dismissed officers. The strike continued until the local militia and
volunteer policemen restored law and order to the city. The striking
policemen were dismissed and replacements hired on the terms which
the police force had originally requested.
This affiliation of the Boston police union with the AFL manifested
a reversal of the old policy of the parent union to refuse charters
to police forces which organized unions and applied for affiliation.
As a result of this policy reversal the federation received more applications for charters than ever before in the same span of time.
Immediately following the strike, the publication of the famed
statement of Calvin Coolidge, then Governor of Massachusetts, that 9
"There is no right to strike against the public safety by any body, any
time, any where," aroused public opinion which in turn caused the
collapse of the entire police union movement.
It must be remembered that the issue in the Boston episode, as
shown by Mayor Peters' statement, was the right to organize, not
the issue of the policemen's right to strike. At all times both the
policemen and the AFL contended that they did not want to strike,
deplored the necessity of striking, but were forced by the police commissioner's actions to do so. Using as its foundation the power of
public opinion, Coolidge's statement has become so firmly entrenched
in our legal thinking as to have the dignity of a legal maxim. Consequently, today when municipal police officers are reviving the police
union movement to avoid the economic distress resulting from a fixed
income, opponents resort to the statement even though the true issue
is whether policemen have a right to join unions, not whether they
have a right to strike.
II.
The right of man to organize has long been recognized. As de
Tocqueville stated: 10
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for
himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow
9 COO~iDGE, op. cit. supranote 7,at 134.
10 As quoted in SPERo, op. cit. supra note 5, at ix.
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creatures and of acting in common with them. The right of association
therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the right
of personal liberty.

While this right to organize was considered fundamental from the
earliest times, its application to certain classes, especially workingmen,
was slow in coming. 11
In the early days of the American labor movement, the courts of
this country, by applying the criminal conspiracy doctrine to attempts
by workingmen to organize trade unions, made unionization impossible.1 2 In 1842 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Commonwealth
v. H unt,1 3 circumvented the criminal conspiracy doctrine which had

denied labor the right to organize, and since then, this right has not
been seriously questioned. In the years after Commonwealth v. Hunt
a trend toward a more positive viewpoint developed. In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.,14 one of the cases which determined the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court
stated that the right to organize was a fundamental right. A later
Supreme Court case 15 determined that this right is a fundamental one
which exists independent of the National Labor Relations Act.
Thus our courts have finally come to an acceptance of the principle
that workingmen have the right to organize for their mutual benefit
and assistance. As was said in City of Springfield v. Clouse: 16
Organization by citizens is a method of the democratic way of life
and most helpful to the proper functioning of our representative form
of government. It should be safeguarded and encouraged as a means
for citizens to discuss their problems together and to bring them to the
attention of public officers and legislative bodies. Organizations are likewise
helpful to bring public officers and employees together to survey their
work and suggest improvements in the public service as well as in their
own working conditions.

The right to organize, while generally held applicable to laborers
in private employment, was nonetheless denied for a great number of
years to those publicly employed. 17 Later when the rule which barred
11 Illustrative of the struggle for recognition fought by groups of workingmen
are the following cases: People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 1835); Quinn v.
Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495; Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants, [1901] A. C. 426; Rex v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 8 Mod.
10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (K. B. 1721).
12 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 1835). See P-H LABOR CoUnsE, U[
1023
(1950).

45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 111 (1842).
14 301 U. S. 1, 33, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
15 Amalgamated Utility Workers (C.I.O.) v. Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, 309 U. S. 261, 60 S. Ct. 561, 84 L. Ed. 738 (1940).
16 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W. (2d) 539, 542 (1947).
17 People v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917); McAuliffe v.
Mayor, Etc., of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (where
policemen were denied the right -to become members of a political committee).
13
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public or municipal employees from organizing underwent a transition,
there evolved the rule that municipal employees had the right to
organize and affiliate with unions for their mutual benefit in the absence
of a specific prohibition.' s The decision in City of Springfield v. Clouse,
resulted in further modification of the rule for it recognized that
municipal employees possessed a right to organize even though they
do not possess the usual incidents of union organizations, as for
example, the right of collective bargaining.
While municipal workers now have the right to form unions,
policemen, usually regarded as being apart from other municipal
employees, have not been accorded a similar right. 19 This nebulous
distinction or discrimination is also applied to firemen.20 A clear
pronouncement of the distinction was made in Carter v. Thompson: 21
Police and fire departments are in a class apart. Both are at times
charged with the preservation of public order, and for manifold reasons
they owe to the public their undivided allegiance. The power in the
city of complete control is imperatively necessary if discipline is to be
maintained.
Some courts have gone further and have likened the policeman to a
22
soldier under arms.
Using the distinction between police and firemen and other municipal
employees as the basis, the courts have been reluctant to apply to
police forces the rule that municipal employees may organize. Thus
the courts follow the old rule and recognize that policemen have the
right to organize in the absence of express prohibition. Evidence of
this rule is the fact that police unions, affiliated with the AFL, do
exist in many of our cities. 2 3 Usually the municipal authorities are
more apt to prohibit police unions, and at the same time allow unions
of firemen. This is true in New York City where the firemen were
permitted to unionize while the policemen were denied a union. 24 The
prohibition sometimes takes the form of a municipal ordinance, 25 but
18
19

Hagan v. Picard, 171 Misc. 475, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 873 (Sup. Ot. 1939).
Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310, 311-2

(1943).
20

McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503, 505-6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Carter

v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410, 412 (1935).
21 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410, 412 (1935).
22 Coane v. Geary, 298 Ill. App. 199, 18 N.E. (2d) 719 (1939); Fraternal
Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310 (1943).

23 N. Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1951, § 1, p. 1, col. 3.
24 N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1951, p. 14, col. 3: "When it was called to Mr.
Monaghan's attention yesterday that members of the Fire Department belong
to the Uniformed Firemen's Association, A.F.L., he replied that there was 'no
comparison' because 'the Police Department deals with and directs 'human beings,
and the Fire Department deals with physical fact.'"
25 Hickman v. City of Mobile....Ala...., 53 So. (2d) 752 (1951); C.I.O.
v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W. (2d) 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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more frequently is manifested in an order from the police commissioner. 26 The prohibition need not be in effect at the time or prior
to the attempted organization, though generally the prohibition follows
the attempt to organize or the actual organization, as in the Boston
incident. In Hickman v. City of Mobile,2 7 an ordinance which prohibited police membership in unions after a certain date, and which
provided for dismissal of all policemen who had not dissolved their
union affiliations by that date, was unconstitutional in that it was ex
post facto. Despite this determination the court held that the city
could validly prohibit union membership by police and firemen.
The general rule might be said to be that the municipality may,
either through the city council or the police commissioner, validly
prohibit policemen from organizing or affiliating with labor unions,
and that the prohibition may be announced either before or after
the attempt to organize.2 8 In the absence of any prohibition the right
to organize is apparently recognized, but remains a perilous right,
since it is subject to suspension by express prohibition.
The reasons for this rule vary. When municipal employees in
general were attempting to organize the argument was advanced that
a municipality could not contract with labor unions.29 This contention
was based on the grounds that such contracts would conflict with the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution
and with state and local laws.3 0 Though thi argument, standing by
itself, has never been given much weight judicially, and while no
court of last resort has determined the validity of this type of contract,3 1 nonetheless, it is sometimes advanced to thwart police unionization.
Usually the contention that a municipality cannot contract with a
labor union representing municipal employees is coupled with the
32
reasoning that a municipality cannot collectively bargain with itself.

This contention has also been offered against attempted police unions.
26 Perez v. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App.
(2d) 638, 178 P. (2d) 537 (1947); Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306
Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310 (1943); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss.
676, 24 So. (2d) 319 (1946); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W. (2d) 547 (1947).
27

....Ala ...., 53 So. (2d) 752 (1951).

See note 26 supra.
Report No. 76 of the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers on the Powma or Mumc'Ain s To ENT=R niTo LABOR UNION CONTRACTS
- A SURVEY oF LAW AN Expmum~c. But see CI.O. General Counsel Memorandum as set out in Appendix, RPYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND Mvm.iciAL E10LOvT
28

29

Rn-NE,

LAw 541-3 (1946).
30
31
32

Ibid.

EmpLOY LAW 33 (1946).
Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d) 194,
197 (1946).
RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MuIcIPAL
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It is sometimes maintained that the wages, hours and working conditions of municipal employees, including policemen, are established by
law, either state or local, and that since changes can only be had by
altering the-laws, collective bargaining is impossible. 33
Another facet of this argument, based largely on statutory interpretation, is that it would be an unlawful delegation of power for a
municipality to contract and bargain collectively with a labor union.3 4
Generally the question whether the municipality has the power to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union is a matter
of legislative intent.
This reasoning as applied to police unions should have no great
effect. While collective bargaining is an ordinary incident of union
organization, it is not essential. Also, municipal employees have the
right to seek changes in laws or regulations affecting working conditions either by petition to the legislature, or in the form of hearings
conducted by appropriate agencies.3 5 If policemen may appear individually before commissions which determine hours, wages and working
conditions, can it be argued that their delegated representative, a
union, has not the right to come before the same commission and
present the policemen's case?
In addition to the argument that a municipality cannot collectively
bargain with labor unions, there are other more forceful reasons which
have been applied in upholding prohibitions against police unions. The
first of these is usually referred to as the "dual loyalty" problem.3 6 It is
generally stated that a policeman cannot serve two masters, that his
entire allegiance must be to the public whom he has sworn to serve.
It is contended that when a policeman joins a union he takes upon
himself a second allegiance, to the union, which conflicts with the
first.
The problem of dual loyalty is not new in labor law for it has had
a limited application to plant watchmen.3 7 The plant watchman is
hired specifically to guard the property of his employer, to whom he
owes his first allegiance. It had been said that when trouble arose
between union and employer a plant watchman who belonged to a
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W. (2d) 539, 547 (1947).
Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.
(2d) 745, 747 (1946); see 10 McQuhLIN, MUNIciPAL CoRpoRATioNs § 29.07 (3d
ed. 1950).
35 SPrRo, op. cit. supra note 5, at 58-9.
36 Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W. (2d) 310, 312
(1943) (Police and fire departments were said to be in a class apart for their
members owe to the public -their undivided allegiance); City of Jackson v.
McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So. (2d) 319, 324 (1946); Carter v. Thompson, 164
Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410, 412 (1935).
37 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U. S. 416, 423-4, 67 S. Ct.
1274, 91 L. Ed. 1575 (1947).
33

34
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labor organization might put his allegiance to it above his duty to his
employer, to the jeopardy of the latter's property and rights. The
same example is used in applying the dual loyalty argument against
the right of police to organize. 38 The National Labor Relations Act
has provided a patently satisfactory solution by permitting watchmen
to form their own independent union, while denying them the right
to affiliate with any other union. 39 No reason has been advanced why
this solution could not be applied to the similar problem in police
unionization.
A corollary to the dual loyalty reasoning, the most effective argument of all, is that police unions are a menace to the public safety. 40
It is the belief of many people that unions and strikes are practically
synonymous terms. There are a greater number who believe that
unionization at least foments strikes. This is apparently a recurring
malignancy growing out of the Boston police strike. A strike is not
the only method available for policemen to obtain their economic
demands. 4 1 And on the other hand, contrary to the prevailing conception, the right to strike is not confined to labor unions. Strikes can
occur even where there is no union for a strike is merely a joint act
which requires a lawful purpose and a lawful manner of execution. 42
In this country we have had police strikes where there were no police
unions. The first of these, for higher wages, occurred in Ithaca, New
York in 1889, 4 3 and another took place in Rockland, Massachusetts in
1920. It is not to be intimated that the right to organize is not extremely beneficial in exercising the right to strike, for as Ziskind has
written: 44
Although many government strikes have sprung spontaneously from
unorganized workers, the right to organize has always been essential
to -the progress of the strike as well as to the preservation of its gains.
The right to organize has been exercised or assumed some time or other
in the course of practically every strike.

Even admitting that strikes can occur without an organization, the
problem as related to police unions does not appear to be imposing.
38 RPYux, Report No. 129 of the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, LABOR UNIONs

Am

MvuiciPA

EmoLoYE LAw-A Supplementary Report

14.
61 SrAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b) (3) (Supp. 1951).
City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So. (2d) 319, 324 (1946).
41 Chicago Herald American, Nov. 7, 1951, § 1, p. 1, col. 3 (Chicago policemen
threatened -to quit in a body if they did not receive a pay raise by a certain date) ;
Chicago Sun Times, Nov. 12, 1951, § 1, p. 4, col. 4 (The number of traffic tickets
issued by the police department of Yonkers, New York, jumped from seventy-four
tickets daily to over a thousand tickets the day after a municipal election in
which a referendum proposing a pay raise for the members of the police department had been defeated).
42 ZisEiND, op. dt. supra note 5, at 232.
43 Id. at 33-52.
44 Id. at 240-1.
39
40
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The AFL, when it reversed its position and determined to charter
police unions, flatly rejected the policy allowing these unions to strike. 45
Consequently it required every police union which applied for a
charter to have a no-strike clause in its constitution. Even in the
Boston police strike, both the AFL and the police local announced that
they were opposed to police strikes and that only because of the
unreasonableness of the police commissioner did they do so. 4 6 The
argument that the right of police to organize should be denied because
the right is co-existent with the right to strike is not valid, as the
police in general do not demand a right to strike as an incident to the
right to organize.
In addition to this self-denial by the police unions of the right
to strike, some states have enacted statutes which prohibit any governmental employee from striking. 47 The New York act, passed in 1947,
declares strikes by public employees to be illegal. 48 Under such an act
police unionism should create no threat of strikes.
One final argument which has been raised against police unionism
is that unionization tends to break down departmental discipline. 49 No
specific examples have been cited, but rather it appears as a generalization used to give greater force to those decisions which uphold the
validity of prohibitions upon attempts by policemen to organize and
affiliate with labor unions.
Conclusion
The right of policemen to organize is generally recognized in the
absence of prohibition, but where the prohibition exists the courts
uphold its validity. While municipal employees in general are now
recognized as having the right to organize, policemen are not allowed
the benefits of this rule, where there is an express prohibition denying
them the right to organize. When the courts were upholding prohibitions
on the right of all public employees to organize, some of the reasons
given were that the municipality could not contract with labor unions,
nor bargain collectively with them. These reasons are still given a
rather limited, implied application by courts in enforcing a prohibition
against a police union. In order to lay a stronger foundation for up45

N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.

46

ZisximN,

op. cit. supra note 5, at 46-7.

47 See, e.g. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (2) (1950); TEx. STAT., REv. Civ.
art. 5154c (1948).
48 N. Y. Civil Service Law § 22-a (2): "No person holding a position by

appointment or employment in the government of the state of New York, or in
the government of the several cities, . . . or in any other branch of the public
service, hereinafter called a 'public employee' shall strike."
49 King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W. (2d) 547, 554 (1947).
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holding prohibitions on police union organizations, the problem of
dual loyalty, and the danger that the union might strike were given
as additional reasons.
Contrasted with this is the view that the right to organize is
fundamental and valuable to all classes of employees. The question is
whether this right can properly be denied to members of municipal
police forces. Admittedly, the right can be denied, but it should be
so nullified only where the reasons are forceful and compelling. Are
the reasons given for denying the right to policemen sufficiently forceful
and compelling? The right to organize exists independent of the right
to bargain collectively and sign a contract, as was shown in the City of
Springfield case. The danger of strike has been answered by the police
union movement itself through no-strike pledges. If these pledges are
unsuccessful the danger could be eliminated by statute. The dual loyalty
argument can be answered by requiring independent unions as in the
plant watchmen situation.
It is the opinion of the writers that the archaic and inapplicable
repercussions of the Boston police strike should not be permitted to
crystallize any real distinction between policemen and other municipal
employees as far as the right to organize is concerned. The same
rule should apply to both.
Andrew V. Giorgi
Donald John Tufts

Taxation

Gi TAX: THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION AND Futm INTERESTS
Many persons seek to escape the almost oppressive burden of the
federal estate tax by giving their property away during life, suffering
only the gentle - by comparison - gift tax. A question that might be
asked today by an individual seeking to transfer part of his estate to
his minor children is: "How may a person make a gift of a present
interest in property that will have the effect of a future interest?"
The result desired is to make a gift of property that will vest presently
but will be secure from whimsical squandering until the recipient
has reached an age of responsibility as there is a reasonable reluctance
to place large sums of money or valuable property in the hands of
youth without restrictions. The gift in trust has been one of the most
popular methods of creating an effective restriction, but the usual
gift in trust is a gift of a "future interest" which Congress has seen
fit to penalize.
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A study will be made here of the various concepts of future interests
developed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts over
the past ten years in connection with tax liability on gifts.
Legislative History
In determining the tax liability for gifts made in any single year,
$3000 is excluded from the amount given each donee." But an exception
is made if the donee receives a gift of a future interest: the exclusion
is not allowed and the total amount of the gift is taxed.
According to the report of the congressional committee, the $3000
exclusion was provided 2
. . . to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting
numerous small gifts, and . . . to fix the amount sufficiently large to
cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasional gifts
of relatively small amounts.

But the committee did not choose to obviate the necessity of accounting
for and reporting small gifts of future interests. The reason was s
".. . the apprehended difficulty, in many instances, in determining
the number of eventual donees and the values of their respective gifts."
This reasoning could have limited application to deny numerous
exclusions where there is an unknown number of donees, or where
it is actually impossible to compute the value of a gift; but it seems
unwarranted to allow no exclusions. If a gift has been made, of necessity
there must be at least one donee. Nevertheless, the reasoning fails to
explain why the exclusion is denied when there is no difficulty in
determining either the number of eventual donees or the value of their
gifts, or when there is only one donee, with no possibility of there
4
being more, who receives a definite sum.

Rv. CoDE § 1003 (b) (3).
H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1932), II Cum. BuLL. 457,
478 (1939); SENr. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1932), II Cum. Bun.
496, 525-6 (1939).
3 Ibid.
4 Several simple examples will point up the type of situations the committee
may have had in mind when it recommended the provision. X gives $3000 to
each of six children, to be held in trust until they reach a certain age. Before
that time three die, the remaining three taking equal shares upon termination
of the trust. The result is: three gifts receive six exclusions unless the exclusions
are denied. The number of eventual donees here may be one or as many as six;
the value of their gifts may be $3000 or $18,000. However, there will be at least
one gift for which, it is submitted, one exclusion should be allowed. Where a
trustee may or may not apply income, or may apply it to whomsoever he chooses,
in his discretion, it is impossible to compute the actuarial value of each donee's
share. Dependent on how the trustee distributes, several donees may receive
nothing and one donee may receive a large sum. Likewise, valuation is impossible
if after-born children may share in a fund with present donees. In these situations,
also, no more than one exclusion should be allowed.
1

2

INT.
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Regardless of the invalidity of the reasons for the strange provision,
the exclusion was denied as to gifts of future interests in the 1932
Revenue Act. 5 After several amendments, 6 the present provision of
the Internal Revenue Code provides: 7
In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
. . . the first $3,000 of such gifts .

.

. shall not . . . be included in the

total amount of gifts....

Early Interpretation
It must be understood at the outset that the concept of "future
interests" where the gift tax is involved is not necessarily the same
as a future interest in the laws of property and conveyancing. The
courts, in tax cases, do not look to the definitions in the various state
statutes 8 or to the common law, 9 but are concerned only with the
interest of the donee.10 The question is: is there a postponement of
enjoyment of specific rights, powers or privileges?" Or it might be
put: when does enjoyment begin? 12 If enjoyment begins sometime
after completion of the gift, rather than immediately upon completion,
the gift is of a future interest. 13
The Regulations state: 14
"Future interests" is a legal term, and includes reversions, remainders,
and other interests or estates, whether vested or contingent, and whether
or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to
commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time.
The term has no reference to such contractual rights as exist in a bond,
note (though bearing no interest until maturity), or in a policy of life
insurance, the obligations of which are to be discharged by payment in
Revenue Act of 1932, § 504 (b), 47 STAT. 247 (1932).
6 The Revenue Act of 1938, § 505 (b), 52 STAT. 565 (1938), enlarged the
exclusion until the Revenue Act of 1942, § 454, 56 STAT. 953 (1942), reinstated
the original clause..
5

INT. REv. CoDE § 1003 (b) (3).
8 United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403, 61 S. Ct. 659, 85 L. Ed. 913
(1941).
9 Wisotzkey v. Commissioner, 144 F. (2d) 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1944).
10 Ibid.
11 Howe v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 310 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
841, 65 S. Ct. 585, 89 L. Ed. 1403 (1944), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 886, 65 S.
Ct. 682, 89 L. Ed. 1435 (1945); Wisotzkey v. Commissioner, 144 F. (2d) 632
(3d Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Lowden, 131 F. (2d) 127 (7th Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Glos (Gloss), 123 F. (2d) 548 (7th Cir. 1941).
12 Commissioner v. Sharp, 153 F. (2d) 163, 164 (9th Cir. 1946).
13 Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. (2d) 785 (3d Cir. 1950). Donee was
20 years and 9 months old and would have absolute right to the trust income
when he reached 21. The -three month period during which his right was
contingent was considered substantial.
14 26 CODE FED. R.Es. § 86.11 (1949).
7
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the future. But a future interest or interests in such contractual obligations
may be created by the limitations contained in a trust or other instrument
of transfer employed in effecting a gift....
Before 1941 no great difficulty was experienced in making gifts
in trust, or otherwise, of present interests. While it was held that a
15
gift was of a future interest if enjoyment depended upon survivorship,
there were decisions granting the exclusion on the ground that no
16
difficulty was met in determining the number of eventual donees,
no intervening life estate was created, 1 7 the donor had divested himself
of full title, 1 8 and the trustee was the donee, causing enjoyment to
19
Typical of the liberal interpretation is the decision in
be immediate.
Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 20 where a gift in trust provided for
accumulation until a future time. The court admitted that enjoyment
was conditional, but held that it was to commence at once and was
for the sole and immediate benefit of the donees.
The year of great change was 1941. Virtually all of the earlier
interpretations were ignored; only the theory that a future interest
existed if enjoyment was dependent upon survivorship remained. In
brief, it was held that a gift in trust was a gift to the beneficiary,
21
the interest transferred by the donor
not to the trust or trustee,
was not to be considered,2 2 a gift could be of a future interest whether
vested or contingent, 23 and whether or not the number of eventual
24
donees and their respective gifts were fixed and determined.
15 Commissioner v. Gardner, 127 F. (2d) 929 (7th Cir. 1942); David L.
Loew, 42 B.T.A. 17 (1940); Edith Pulitzer Moore, 40 B.TA. 1019 (1939).
16 Commissioner v. Krebs, 90 F. (2d) 880 (3d. Cir. 1937); Noyes v. Hassett,
20 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1937); Charles W. Deeds, 37 B.T.A. 293 (1938).
17

Is

Ibid.

Commissioner v. Wells, 88 F. (2d) 339 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Noyes v. Hassett,
20 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1937); Edwin Goodman, 41 B.T.A. 472 (1940); Edwin
B. Cox, 38 B.T.A. 865 (1938).
19 -Commissioner v. Krebs, 90 F. (2d) 880 (3rd Cir. 1937); Seymour H.
Knox, 36 B.T.A. 630 (1937).
20 105 F. (2d) 642 (8th Cir. 1939). See also, Mary duPont Faulkner, 41
B.TA. 875 (1940), where a gift to an unborn child was held to be a gift of a
present interest.
21 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653, 85 L. Ed. 909 (1941).
22 Commissioner v. Glos (Gloss), 123 F. (2d) 548 (7th Cir. 1941). See
Commissioner v. Gardner, 127 F. (2d) 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1942), where Commissioner v. Wells, 88 F. (2d) 339 (7th Cir. 1937) (see note 18, supra), is
considered overruled by United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659,
85 L. Ed. 913 (1941).
23 United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659, 85 L. Ed. 913
(1941); Commissioner v. Taylor, 122 F. (2d) 714 (4th Cir. 1941); Welch v.
Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141 (1st Cir. 1941).
24 Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141 (1st Cir. 1941). Commissioner v. Glos
(Gloss), 123 F. (2d) 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1941): ". . . Congress did not limit the
term to any specified category of future interests. It included all." The court

NOTES
Tax Concept of FutureInterests
25
After deciding that a gift in trust was a gift to the beneficiary,
the Supreme Court set out to guide aright the divergent wanderings
of the lower courts. In United States v. Pelzer,26 gifts in trust were
executed with provision for income to be accumulated until the beneficiaries reached a certain age; the gifts were, under Alabama law,
of present interests. The Court emphasized that local laws were to be
ignored in this question and gave judicial sanction to the definition
in the Treasury Regulations. 27 The gifts, it was said, were postponed
until the happening of a future uncertain event (reaching a specific age)
and this made the number of donees and the value of their gifts difficult
to ascertain.2 8

In Ryerson v. United States,2 9 two trusts were considered. In one,

there were gifts of separate equal shares of the corpus of the trust
to each of two trustees, and the trust provided that they could reach
their shares by a simple joint request that the trust be terminated.
The Court held that since enjoyment was dependent upon a contingency
that might never occur, that is, the donees might never agree to join
in the request for termination, the interests were future. In the other
trust, it was held that enjoyment was dependent upon survivorship
and was a gift of a future interest.
In the same year, 1941, the concept of future interests, begun by
the Supreme Court, was amplified in the Court of Appeals for, the First
Circuit. 3 0 It was held, and the court cited the Restatement of Proper-

ty, 31 that the question of whether the property was vested in the
donee was of no concern. The Pelzer and Ryerson cases were distinguished because, as the court said, those cases involved interests which
were future under any definition of the term; 32 while in the case in
question, each beneficiary received a whole beneficial interest, no
preceding beneficial interest was given to another person, and if a
beneficiary should die before reaching twenty-one, the property devolved through his estate. It was admitted that the interest might be
pointed out that the difficulty in determining the number of donees was only
one reason for denying the exclusion. However, the court gave no other reasons
for it.
25 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653, 85 L. Ed. 909 (1941).
26
27
28

312 U.S. 399, 61 S. Ct. 659, 85 L. Ed. 913 (1941).
26 CoDE FED. REcs. § 86.11 (1949).
United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 404, 61 S. Ct. 659,

85 L. Ed.

913 (1941).
29

30
31

85 L. Ed. 917 (1941).
Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141 (1st Cir. 1941).
REsTA
mEbT, PRoPERTY § 153 (1936).
312 U.S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656,

32 But in -the Pelzer case the gifts, as defined by Alabama statutes and the
case law of that state, were considered to be gifts of present interests. United
States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402, 61 S. Ct. 659, 85 L. Ed. 913 (1941).
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defined as a present interest, but the court chose to follow the definition
set forth in the Regulations and held the interest to be future.
The Supreme Court heard two cases on the subject in 1945. In
Fondren v. Commissioner,33 the interests of the donees were vested.
The trustee was to accumulate the income until the beneficiaries were
35 years old, applying it to the use of the beneficiaries, if necessary,
for their support, education or maintenance, and the corpus could be
used if the trustee thought it necessary. There was also a spendthrift
provision. Enjoyment was held to be contingent on a future uncertain
event; a barrier of time was imposed between execution and enjoyment
and the exclusion was denied.
In Commissioner v. Disston,3 4 the trustee was to accumulate income
until the minor beneficiaries came of age, although he could apply
income to their benefit where necessary for education, support, or
comfort. The gift was held to be one of a future interest since there
was no indication that a steady flow of a portion of the income would
be necessary. The lower court 35 had held the interest to be present
on the grounds that there was no difficulty in ascertaining the number
of donees nor the value of their gifts and that the restriction on the
gifts was merely one that would have been imposed by law, if it had
36
not been provided for in the trust instrument.
The Supreme Court, after these two brief forays into the field,
in 1941 and 1945, laid the matter aside. If it thought that the matter
was settled, the extensive litigation on the point 37 labels the thought
presumptive. It is settled that a gift is of a future interest if it is
limited to commence in use, enjoyment, or possession at a future time
rather than immediately upon completion of the gift. But the rule
means nothing unless what is meant by "use, possession and enjoyment" is explained. The Bureau, apparently, had "physical" in mind
when it interpreted the words.38 Shortly after the Fondren and Disston
decisions, the Court cited both for the proposition that "enjoyment"
was not a term of art, but one that connotes a substantial present
economic benefit, rather than a technical vesting of title.3 9 Certainly
33
34
35
36

324 U. S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 499, 89 L. Ed. 668 (1945).
325 U. S. 442, 65 S. Ct. 1328, 89 L. Ed. 1720 (1945).
Disston v. Commissioner, 144 F. (2d) 115 (3d Cir. 1944).

Id. at 118.
"The cases involving this exception to the gift tax exemption are many
and constantly growing." United States v. Knell, 149 F. (2d) 331, 332 (7th
Cir. 1945).
38 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. (2d) 118 (7th Cir. 1951). It was
there stated at 121: "Without expressly so stating, the Commissioner's position
appears to be that the words in the Treasury Regulation . . . mean that the
beneficiary must have the actual, physical use, possession or enjoyment of the
property. .. ."
39 Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480, 486, 66 S. Ct. 257,
90 L. Ed. 228 (1946).
37

NOTES
the Court would not deny the possibility of a gift of a future interest

being of present economic benefit. 4 0 Perhaps the speaker for the Court,

when explaining terms to the nation, "should explain his explana41
tions."
Gifts in Tust
The annual exclusion was denied to all gifts made in trust after
Following Helvering v. Hutchings,4 3 the exclusion was restored 44 unless the gift in trust was of a future interest.
The broad rule has developed that a future interest is given whenever
enjoyment, use or possession is dependent upon a contingency. If the
donee must survive the donor for enjoyment or must live until some
future certain or uncertain time, numerous cases define his interest
as future. 45 Attempts have been made to avoid this rule by providing
that if the donee-beneficiary dies before he reaches the specified age,
the property devolves through his estate. This, standing alone, has
been ineffective, the interest still being regarded as a future interest. 46
It would seem, then, that any trust providing that the donee take
possession when he reaches a certain age would be a gift of a future
interest. This result is also reached if enjoyment is dependent upon
1938.42

40 In Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656, 85 L. Ed.
917 (1941), the trust could be terminated by joint action of the trustees, at
which time the corpus would be distributed to the trustees. Can it be said that
they had no present, economic benefit? See also, the example suggested in
Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141, 142 (1st Cir. 1941): A gives land to B for
life, remainder to C in fee. Certainly C's enjoyment is postponed and he has
only a future interest, but he also has a substantial, present economic benefit.
41 Byron, Don Juan,Dedication, stanza 2, lines 7-8.
42 Revenue Act of 1938, § 505, 52 STAT. 565 (1938); INT. REv. CODE § 1003
('b) (1).
43 312 U. S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653, 85 L. Ed. 909 (1941). Before the statute
denying the exclusion to gifts in trust, it was possible for a donor to make gifts
to numerous trusts for the benefit of one beneficiary. Because the trusts were
considered the donees, the donor received numerous exclusions (one for each
trust), although in fact there was only one gift to one beneficiary. See McBrier
v. Commissioner, 108 F. (2d) 967 (3d Cir. 1939); Welch v. Davidson, 102 F.
(2d) 100, 103 (1st Cir. 1939); Edwin B. Cox, 38 B.T.A. 865 (1938). After the
Hutchings ruling, that -the beneficiary was the donee, there was no longer any
necessity for the statutory provision.
44 Revenue Act of 1942, § 454, 56 STAT. 953 (1942); INT. REV. CODE § 1003
(b) (2).
45 Hutchings-Sealy Nat. Bank of Galveston v. Commissioner, 141 F. (2d)
422 (5th Cir. 1944); Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F. (2d) 883 (7th Cir.
1943); Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 383 (9th Cir. 1942); Commissioner
v. Boeing, 123 F. (2d) 86 (9th Cir. 1941); Thomson v. Reynolds, 54 F. Supp.
409 (D. Minn. 1944); Andrew Geller, 9 T. C. 484 (1947); Alma M. Myer, 2
T. C. 291 (1943).
46 Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141 (1st Cir. 1941); Jesse S. Phillips, 12
T. C. 216 (1949). But cf. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. (2d) 118 (7th Cir.
1951); Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W. D. N. C. 1951).
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some future action or event. 47 A future interest exists where some
discretion is placed in the trustee to accumulate or distribute, on the
not necessarily distribute, possession and
ground that since he will
48
enjoyment are contingent.
Restrictions on enjoyment usually make the interest a future one.
As seen above, this is true where the trustee has discretion to distribute
or accumulate income. A stronger case is presented when the trust
provides that the trustee--"in his discretion" or "if necessary"-is to
apply income to the support, maintenance, education or comfort of the
beneficiary. The trust instruments, of course, invariably contain other
provisions that might affect the decision; but it would probably be
held that a provision of this nature would make the interest future. 49
To take advantage of the exclusion, the trust instrument should
provide for the immediate application for the benefit of the donees.
It cannot be said that a spendthrift provision alone is sufficient to
make the gift one of a future interest. However, this provision has
been contained in numerous trusts which were declared to be future
interests 50 and did not appear in any of the late cases where gifts
were held to be present interests.
A trust for children in which after-born children may participate,
that is, a class trust, will make valuation of the right to income im52
possible. 5 1 This may be avoided by specifically naming the donees.
47 Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656, 85 L. Ed. 917
(1941); Howe v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 310 (7th Cir. 1944); Commissioner
v. Brandegee, 123 F. (2d) 58 (1st Cir. 1941); Hopkins v. Magruder, 122 F.
(2d) 693 (4th Cir. 1941); Willis D. Wood, 16 T. C. No. 118, P-H 1951 TC
REP. DEc. 16.118 (1951).
48 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442, 65 S. Ct. 1328, 89 L. Ed. 1720
(1945); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 499, 89 L. Ed. 668
(1945); Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656, 85 L. Ed. 917
(1941); Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. (2d) 785 (3d Cir. 1950); French
v. Commissioner, 138 F. (2d) 254 (8th Cir. 1943); Estate of Ethel K. Childers,
10 T. C. 566 (1948); Estate of Simon Guggenheim, 1 T. C. 845 (1943). See also:
Helvering v. Blair, 121 F. (2d) 945 (2d Cir. 1941). Contra: Smith v. Commissioner,
131 F. (2d) 254 (8th Cir. 1942); Noyes v. Hassett, 20 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass.
1937). The latter case is considered overruled, Wizotzkey v. Commissioner, 144
F. (2d) 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1944); and Smith v. Commissioner was criticized
in Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1942).
49 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442, 65 S. Ct. 1328, 89 L. Ed. 1720
(1945) (education, comfort and support); Commissioner v. Taylor, 122 F. (2d)
714 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 699, 62 S. Ct. 479, 86 L. Ed. 559
(1942) (support and education); United States v. Knell, 149 F. (2d) 331 (7th
Cir. 1945); Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141 (1st Cir. 1941) (support, maintenance
or education); Estate of Frank M. Gould, P-H 1947 TC Mxr. DEc. fT47,176
(1947).
50 Disston v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 442, 65 S. Ct. 1328, 89 L. Ed. 1720
(1945); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 499, 89 L. Ed. 668
(1945); Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. (2d) 785 (3d Cir. 1950).
51 The value of a gift of a present right to income from property is
determined by using a hypothetical annuity at the rate of four percent. 26

NOTES
Insurance and Other Gifts
A gift of an insurance policy seems to be an effective way of making
a present disposition of property, the benefit of which will be realized
in the future. The Regulations state that the term "future interests"
has no reference to the contractual rights existing in a policy of life
insurance though the obligation is to be discharged by payment in the
future. 5 3 But the Regulations continue, stating that a future interest
may be created by limitations contained in the instrument used to effect
the gift.54 There is no doubt that an assignment of the benefits of an
insurance policy is a taxable gift if no power remains in the insured
to revoke or revest the benefits in himself or his estate, even though
it is conditioned upon survival by the donee-beneficiary. 55
Under the early theory that an interest is future where enjoyment
is dependent upon survivorship, it would seem that any gift of life
insurance would be of a future interest. This has been held where an
insurance policy was transferred in trust.56 Insurance placed in trust
is held to be a gift of a future interest for the same reason that other
property placed in trust is a gift of a future interest. If enjoyment
58
is postponed to the happening of a future event, 57 or is contingent,
the gift is of a future interest.
Generally the payment of premiums on insurance policies held in
trust is a gift of a future interest. 59 An outright gift of an insurance
policy has been held to be a gift of a future interest if the donee could
neither effect a cash surrender nor borrow money against it.60 And if
postponement of enjoyment creates a future interest of the policy,
CODE FED. REcs. § 86.19 (f) (5) (1949). The right of an after-born child to share
in income will decrease the value of the right of the other donees. A valuation
at the time of the gift could only be made by computing the number of
children who will be born after the gift and who will share in it. Mathematical
tables have not gone that far.
52 Estate of Edward R. Kregar, 8 T.C. 1199 (1947).
53 26 Coon FFD. REcs. § 86.11 (1949).
54 Ibid.
55 26 CoDE FED. RFGs. § 86.2 (a) (8) (1949).
G6
Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656, 85 L. Ed. 917
(1941); Hopkins v. Magruder, 122 F. (2d) 693 (4th Cir. 1941). See also:
Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 F. (2d) 86 (9th Cir. 1941).
57 Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 F. (2d) 86 (9th Cir. 1941).
58 Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 61 S. Ct. 656, 85 L. Ed. 917
(1941); Francis P. Bolton, 1 T.C. 717 (1943).
59 Joe J. Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943); Frances P. Bolton, 1 T.C. 717
(1943). Contra: Jack L. Warner, 42 B.T.A. 954, 957 (1940), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F. (2d) 913 (9th Cir. 1942).
The payment of the premium by the primary beneficiary is not a gift. Gilbert
Pleet, 17 T. C. No. 11, P-H 1951 TC REP. DEc. ff 17.11 (1951); Grace R. Seligmann
9 T. C. 191 (1947).
60 Joe J. Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943); George B. Caudle, P-H 1945 TC ME.
DEc.f 45,100 (1945).
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so also may it create a future interest of the premiums paid by the
donor. 61 Where policies were assigned to the donor's children, to be
delivered to and held by their mother, but were restricted in that
they were to be held three years before they had loan value or could
be surrendered for cash, it was held that premium payments in 1935
and 1936 were gifts of future interests, but the exclusion was allowed
on the 1937 payment because at that time the rights of the donees
were immediately available.
In a case which followed the Ryerson decision, the donor assigned
all rights and privileges to his children jointly. The Tax Court held
that exercise of the right of ownership required joint action by all the
children and that this postponed enjoyment until the joint action was
taken. 62 This was affirmed in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.

63

A gift of an annuity was held to be a gift of a future interest
where the annuity payments were to begin many years in the future,
and if the annuitant died the sums were to be paid to other specifically
named beneficiaries. 64 Though no intervening life estate was created,
there was a postponement of enjoyment and it was contingent upon
survival. A future interest may be created if the donor of the annuity
retains some of the rights and if the annuity contains restrictive
agreements,65 whether in contracts or in trust instruments. 66
The conveyance of property with a life estate reserved is, of course,
a gift of a future interest.67 The fact that the corpus of a trust consisted of notes bearing no interest will not, of itself, cause a gift
to be of a future interest. 68
In a case decided since the Fondren and Disston decisions, the donor
made gifts to children, turning the property over to their parents as
guardians, to accumulate the income until the donees reached the
and possession were postponed
age of 21. It was held that enjoyment
69
and the exclusion was not allowed.
Nashville Trust Co., P-H 1943 TC Maa. DEC. 1143,485 (1943).
Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950).
63 Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F. (2d) 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
64 Roberts v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 324
U. S. 841, 65 S. Ct. 585, 89 L. Ed. 1403 (1944). See also Elizabeth C. Morrow,
2 T.C. 210 (1943). A future interest was created because enjoyment was dependent
upon survival.
65 Clara Ream, P-H 1943 TC MEx. DEc. 1 43,501 (1943).
66 Id., fT43,501 at p. 1603.
67 Rosa A. Howze, 2 T.C. 1254 (1943).
68 Commissioner v. Kempner, 126 F. (2d) 853 (5th Cir. 1942).
69 Katherine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947).
61

62

NOTES
Gifts to Minors
The courts have never held that it is impossible to execute a gift
of a present interest to a minor or incompetent. However, there is
reason to believe that the Bureau takes a different view.70 Unfortunately, in the Fondren decision, 7 1 the Court refused to decide this
issue since there it was only mentioned and not presented to the Court
for determination. The Court merely found appealing the argument
of the taxpayer that if the gift there involved did not confer immediate
enjoyment, no gift to a minor could be a present interest. 2
Under state laws legal disabilities are imposed on the enjoyment of
property by minors and incompetents.7 3 In a recent case 74 the Commissioner advanced, but did not develop, the argument that these disabilities restricted the minor-donee's immediate enjoyment, making the
gifts future interests. The court rejected the argument as untenable,
saying, 75 "If that view were carried to its logical conclusion, all gifts
to minors would be subject to the same contention." In another recent
case 76 the court said that while the Commissioner did not expressly
state it, his position seemed to be that for the beneficiary to have a
present interest he must have "actual, physical use, possession or
enjoyment." 77 In oral argument counsel for Commissioner was asked
to give an example of how a gift of a present interest could be given
to a minor. He was only able to suggest that it might be accomplished
by transferring to an existing guardian."8 The court in the Kieckhefer
case concluded that since the Bureau admitted that a gift to a minor
has the same standing as a gift to an adult,79 it will be a gift of a
70

Seenote38supra.

71

Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 499, 89 L. Ed. 668 (1945).

72

Id., 324 U. S. at 29.

73 See, for example, Cannon v. Commissioner, 98 F. Supp. 331, 333 (W.D.
N.C. 1951), where the court listed disabilities applying to minors in North
Carolina.
74 John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC MaEm. Dxc. IT51,044 (1951).
75

Id., f[51,044 at p. 139.

Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. (2d) 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
Id. at 121.
78 Ibid. The Tax Court in John W. Kieckhefer, 15 T.C. 111, 117 (1950), and
in Katherine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453, 463-4 (1947), has stated the necessity
of there being a legally appointed guardian. Gifts made directly to parents,
as guardians, will not necessarily be a gift of a present interest.
79 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. (2d) 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951). It
should be noted that the position of the Commissioner is somewhat inconsistent.
After seeming to argue that a gift to a minor is a gift of a future interest
because the minor does not have "actual possession," ibid., and because of the
legal disabilities imposed on minors by state law, John E. Daniels, P-H 1951
TC M~m. DEc. IT51,044 (1951), the Commissioner admits that gifts "to minor
beneficiaries are placed on an equality with gifts to adults." Kieckhefer v.
Commissioner, supra, at 121.
76
77
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present interest if the only restrictions are those imposed because the
beneficiary cannot legally act on his own behalf.
It is possible that the Bureau is taking this extreme position in an
effort to force the court to rule on it.
Present Interests
There have been some few cases since the decisions in Fondren and
Disston holding gifts to be present interests despite provisions seeking
to postpone or restrict enjoyment. Practically all of these decisions,
of course, distinguished those two important cases.
In Sharp v. Commissioner,80 the trustee was to manage and invest
the trust property and was "'. . . to apply and pay over to the use
and for the benefit of ... [the donor's] son . . . the net income therefrom during his minority ...
," 81 It was to be paid to the donee's
mother or guardian. Another provision in the instrument allowed the
trustee to expend the income in a manner that he believed would help
the son, the balance of income to be accumulated until the son reached
majority. It was held as a matter of fact that the trustee had no
right to withhold the income, that the provision to expend or accumulate was merely a precautionary measure. The donee, then, "had at
once the right of enjoyment." 82 The trust provided for the immediate
application of the funds for the donee's benefit and the exclusion was
allowed. 83 The court distinguished the Fondren decision, where none
of the funds could be immediately expended, and the Disston case,
where there was no evidence that income would be presently "required."
The Sharp decision was followed where the trustee had to pay
over the income for the needs and the best interests of the doneebeneficiary, as though the trustee were a guardian. 84 It was said that
if the gifts had been made to a guardian the exemption would apply.
80 153 F. (2d) 163 (9th Cir. 1946).
81 Id. at 165.
82

Ibid.

83 The court distinguished the Fondren case, but in its decision followed dicta
in that case: "Whenever provision is made for immediate application of the
fund for [the minor's benefit] . . . the exemption applies." Fondren v.
Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18, 29, 65 S. Ct. 499, 89 L. Ed. 668 (1945).

The

exclusion was not allowed where there was a provision for quarterly payments
to -the beneficiary if deemed necessary in the discretion of the trustee. Frances
McGuire Rassas, 17 T.C. No. 19, P-H 1951 TC REP. DEc. f117.19 (1951).
84 Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948). For a thorough
analysis of the Strekalovsky trust and a comparison with trust instruments in
other cases, see Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 TAxEs 911
(1948). See also, Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. N.C. 1951), where
the trustee was to pay over principal from time to time for the support, maintenance, education and pleasures of the donee. The trustees were to act as if

NOTES
Perhaps the most important recent case is Kieckhefer v. Commissioner.85 The trustee was to apply income for the education, support
and maintenance of a minor-donee, making payment to the donee,
parent or guardian, and to accumulate all income not needed until
the beneficiary reached the age of 21. If the donee died before reaching
21, the property was to devolve through his estate, and the trust
could be terminated upon the demand of a legally appointed guardian.
Because the Tax Court thought it unreasonable to suppose that a sixmonth-old donee would make a demand on the trust or that the courts
of the state would necessarily appoint a guardian, it found the gift
to be of a future interest. 86 The circuit court reversed, emphasizing the
provision which would permit the trust to be terminated and distributed
to the beneficiary upon demand of a guardian. The provision, it said, 87
took the case out of the Fondren and Disston rules. The circuit court
also stated, and it is an important addition to the "tax" concept of
future interests, especially where the donee is a minor or incompetent,
that if the restriction upon immediate enjoyment is imposed by the
trust instrument, it is a future interest, but if it is imposed by the
legal disabilities arising from state law, it is a present interest.88
Several other late cases have held that the trust income was a gift
of a present interest on the ground that it was to be immediately applied
to the use of the beneficiary.89 Where the income from a trust is held
to be a gift of a present interest, the question of whether the corpus
is a gift of a present interest will only arise if the value of the right
to income is less than the $3000 exclusion. 90 Since the value of the
present right to receive income is determined by the use of annuity
tables,9 1 there must be a predictable corpus. If the trustee may apply
income or accumulate it, if he may invade or exhaust the corpus, in
his discretion, valuation of the present right to income is impossible.0 2
they were legally appointed guardians. It was held to be a gift of a present
interest. The court cited the Strekalovsky and Sharp cases.
189 F. (2d) 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
86 John W. Kieckhefer, 15 T.C. 111 (1950).
85
87

Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. (2d) 118, 119 (7th Cir. 1951).

88 Id. at 122. There is some indication that this distinction was made earlier
in Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T.C. 298, 304 (1943).
89 Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F. (2d) 755 (8th Cir. 1949); Jesse S. Phillips,
12 T.C. 216 (1949).
90 The gift of corpus and income is considered as one gift. If there is a
present interest of income valued at $3000, the maximum exclusion allowed, the
nature of the interest of the remainder of the gift is immaterial. See Sharp v.
Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 163 (9th Cir. 1946).
91 26 Conx FED. REGs. § 86.19 (f) (5) (1949).
92 As Learned Hand stated in Helvering v. Blair, 121 F. (2d) 945, 947
(1941), where the trustee had the power to apportion income among the beneficiaries as he saw fit: "In order to calculate the value of an interest subject to
such a condition, we should have to have some actuarial basis for the probability
that trustees who had once made . . . [an apportionment] would not disturb it."
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If the trustee's authority to invade the corpus is limited to a specified
maximum amount each year, the value of the right to income is
determined on the assumption that the trust estate will be reduced
annually to the extent of the maximum allowed. 93
That the donor gave a minor-donee as much use, possession and
enjoyment as possible under the state law has been said to be immaterial. 94 The same court also posed, but did not answer, the question:
does a minor-donee have the present use and possession of property
which he owns in fee, as the result of a gift, but which the state
law expressly requires to be handled by a guardian? 95 Possibly, the
Kieckhejer decision has provided the answer. An outright gift of stock
to minors was a present interest, even though the dividends they
received had to be endorsed by others before they could be used. 96
Only two other late cases holding gifts to be of present interests have
been found: one was based on a rather odd interpretation of the trust
provisions 97 and the other decision was made, at least as far as can
be determined by the report of the case, without sound reason or
research.98
Conclusion
The Government, while it has not necessarily created a new concept
of future interests, definitely has its own ideas on the subject. One
reason for this is the desire for a uniform, nation-wide scheme of
taxation. 99 Another possible reason is that the term "future interest"
is not a stable one. What is deemed a future interest today, may well
be labeled a present interest tomorrow.' 00
This reasoning applies wherever trustees may vary -the amount that is in the
corpus. In short, actuarial tables cannot take into consideration the whims of
trustees.
93

Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F. (2d)

755 (8th Cir. 1949); Lockard v.

Commissioner, 166 F. (2d) 409 (1st Cir. 1948).
94 Ashcraft v. Allen, 90 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M. D. Ga. 1950).
95 Ibid.
96
97

John E. Daniels, P-H 1951 TC MEm. DEc. f151,044 (1951).
Louise McCoy, P-H 1947 TC Mxw. Dxc. 1[47,272 (1947). Income was

to be applied for the benefit of the beneficiaries as deemed necessary in the
discretion of the trustee. Quarterly payments were provided for. The court
by deciding that income would be paid in any event apparently ignored the
discretionary nature of the trust.
98 Blaugrund v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Tex. 1946). The
court cited no cases and gave no reasons, merely saying: the property was
for the immediate use of the beneficiaries, though possession was in the trustees.
99 United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 402, 61 S. Ct. 659, 85 L. Ed. 913

(1941).

100 See Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 749, 783
(1937): "No one who has given any consideration to the tremendous changes
which have taken place in this field of the law in the past fifty years would
venture to predict what will happen within the next half century."

NOTES
The courts have held that a gift in trust will be taxable in full, the
$3000 exclusion not allowed, where the instrument of transfer provides
that the income is to be applied to the use of the beneficiary if necessary, or in the discretion of the trustee, for his support, maintenance,
comfort or education. The exclusion is not allowed if income is to be
accumulated until a certain future time or is contingent on a future
uncertain event, or where the trustee has discretion to apply or accumulate income. If distribution of the corpus is deferred, the donee has
only a future interest. In short, the exclusion is denied if any
restriction or limitation is created in the trust instrument which
postpones the immediate right of the donee to the use, possession or
enjoyment of the property.
Gifts in trust will be held to be future interests if after-born children
may participate, if the trustee may apportion among several beneficiaries in his discretion, or if he can invade or exhaust the corpus)
on the ground that the value of the gift is uncertain.
Gifts of insurance policies will be gifts of future interests if the
power to borrow against them or to surrender for cash is restricted.
Other gifts will be similarly treated if there are limitations or restrictions on the immediate use or enjoyment. A long-term, non-interest
bearing note given to a donee transfers a present interest, but the
result might be different if there are restrictions on its later transfer.
Some common threads run through the decisions where gifts were
held to be of present interests. The trustee should have no discretion
as to the application of income; no restrictions should be created by
the trust instrument, the one restriction allowed being the legal one
created by state law where the beneficiary is a minor. The donee
should be able to demand the property, through a guardian if he is a
minor. If there is no guardian, one should be provided by the trust
instrument. Mandatory, periodic payments of income to the beneficiary
should be prescribed. A provision that the property is to devolve
through the donee's estate if he dies before the time of distribution,
has apparently encouraged the courts to find the gift to be one of a
present interest.
Needless to say, the primary consideration in the wording of the
trust instrument is to give effect to the intent of the donor. After
that is established, provisions may be incorporated in the instrument
that will not destroy the intent, but will take advantage of the $3000
annual exclusion.
No reason can be given for the denial of the exclusion to all gifts
of future interests. The gift tax is levied so that all transfers of
property, whether they be inter vivos or by will, may be taxed. It is
also for the purpose of discouraging magnanimous pre-death conveyances to avoid the estate tax. The exclusion is allowed because of the

